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Abstract
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) guide emergency responders in a crisis, providing 
predetermined steps to manage anticipated events. Modern disasters, however, often manifest 
as complex systems—susceptible to nonlinear interactions and feedback in the environment 
that produce unanticipated outcomes. As a consequence, the application of prediction-
dependent SOPs to prediction-defiant scenarios yields ineffective emergency management, 
meanwhile case studies demonstrate that adaptation and innovative behavior often succeeds in 
the complex environment. If adaptability mitigates complex problems, then modern crisis SOPs 
must embrace an adaptive approach. 
This article explores the “Disaster Dilemma” of applying predictive SOPs to unpredictable, 
complex disasters, to include a case study of a modern mega-crisis that argues for integrating 
critical thinking and adaptability into crisis response. The article presents the findings of a 
computer simulation of Air Traffic Controller responses during the September 11th terror 
attacks, quantifying hypothetical improvements in response times attained by integrating 
adaptability into crisis response. Finally, the article proposes two practical means of building 
adaptive behaviors into SOP-driven crisis response.  Today’s emergency response paradigm must 
evolve, acclimating to the unpredictable nature of complex crisis environments. 
Introduction
The nature of disasters has evolved, but emergency management has not kept pace with the 
change. Owing to the nature of our complex, globalized society, today’s crisis environment 
is subject to countless influences that result in random and volatile events. Despite the 
unpredictability of today’s crisis arena, the emergency management field still adheres to 
prediction-dependent SOPs to guide response efforts. As a result, police, firefighters, and other 
crisis professionals are less able to manage modern, unpredictable events. 
The traditional SOP anticipates an operating environment and provides a checklist of 
recommended actions to accomplish an objective. Sociologists Charles Parker and Eric Stern 
assert that “SOPs are based on past experience and expectation.”1 As long as the actual event 
adheres to the prediction, personnel can rely on an SOP to impart relevant guidance. However, 
the late twentieth century produced technological improvements in telecommunication and 
information sharing that, in turn, yielded a new, globally interconnected environment.2 This 
significant increase in connectivity and concomitant feedback within local, regional, and global 
systems increased the complexity of many social networks. Sociologists David Snowden and 
Mary Boone describe complexity analysis as a way of understanding the behavior of large 
numbers of agents dynamically reacting to and influencing each other within a system.3  
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One of the essential characteristics of complex systems is that behavioral outcomes are 
often non-intuitive and difficult to predict. Modern disasters can also demonstrate complex 
characteristics, emerging quickly and developing in unexpected ways. 
Dependence on rote procedure while operating in high-stress conditions is a flawed but 
understandable behavior within complex environments.  A variety of work is available that 
examines performance and decision making in a modern crisis setting; this article builds upon the 
significant findings of Snowden and Boone, Parker and Stern, and others.  Conclusions from the 
fields of sociology and behavioral psychology help clarify that the argument against conditioned, 
pre-planned disaster SOPs is not simply a procedural discussion, it is also an assessment of fallible 
human behavior and decision making in today’s crisis environment.  Sociologists Hales and 
Pronovost claim that when judgment and proficiency diminish in a high-stress setting, responders 
often resort to checklists and other cognitive aids in an effort to maintain efficiency.4 Therefore, 
the crisis professional in a complex disaster is even more likely to cling to a rigid, ineffective 
SOP – further decreasing the likelihood of identifying and mitigating the unexpected. This article 
addresses the dilemma of prediction-dependent SOPs applied to prediction-defiant events from 
the central hypothesis that success within a complex environment requires adaptability. 
Problem Statement:  
Complexity Versus Prediction
Toward the end of the twentieth century, tremendous improvements in communication and 
information sharing produced a technological ecosystem able to connect human interests 
around the world. As Uhl-Bien et al. state, “21st century organizations are facing a complex 
competitive landscape driven largely by globalization and the technological revolution.”5 Prior 
to these advancements, organizational relationships had more linear connections, limiting the 
influence that human and non-human elements within a system could exert on each other. 
While a significant number of factors influenced a complicated (linear and deterministic) working 
environment, their relationships often yielded an orderly, predictable outcome. Figure 1 illustrates 
the difference between a complicated and a complex (non-linear and probabilistic) system. 
Figure 1. Complicated System versus Complex System6
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Connectivity in a complex environment allows a multitude of elements within a common system 
to influence each other, producing scenarios and outcomes that defy long-term prediction. 
Emergent events and outcomes are the by-products of nonlinear reactions among agents within 
the system. Snowden and Boone further clarify the significant influence of elements interacting 
within a complex system: “[t]he interactions are nonlinear, and minor changes can produce 
disproportionately major consequences.”7 The principles of complexity apply to the modern 
crisis environment as well. McChrystal et al. make the claim that man-made disasters can exhibit 
the characteristics of a complex system: “[n]ew technologies have created an unprecedented 
proliferation of opportunities for small, historically disenfranchised actors… Terrorists, insurgents, 
and cybercriminals have taken advantage of speed and interdependence to cause death and 
wreak havoc. But it all exhibits the unpredictability that is a hallmark of complexity.”8 Today’s 
complex environment allows terrorist groups to coordinate attack strategies with a mobile 
telephone from anywhere on the planet. Likewise, the connectivity among civil infrastructure 
creates a complex system vulnerable to natural disasters. For example, storm-related damage to 
a local power grid can cause overload and failure in adjacent power grids, resulting in widespread 
blackouts and cascading infrastructure collapses in dependent civil services.9  
The Standard Operating Procedure
The use of SOPs has remained a principal management tool for more than 150 years because 
it offers significant benefits as a guide for personnel expected to operate in the field without 
supervision. Government agencies depend on SOPs to respond to the operating environment 
and provide a checklist of recommended actions that conform to official policy. The SOP 
model attempts to facilitate consistency in executing mission goals by promoting rote 
behavior. Procedures that define emergency response to a crisis vary widely among agencies; 
some provide specific checklist instructions to guide field officers, and others provide loose 
frameworks for their response. As shown in Figure 2, the Chicago Police Department’s Active 
Shooter Incident Plan (circa 2008) exemplifies a highly specific crisis SOP for police officers. 
Figure 2. Excerpt from Chicago Police Department’s Active Shooter Incident Plan10
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These checklist police procedures do not recognize or allow for unanticipated and nonlinear 
complexity and behavior in the scenario. Instead, this example assumes that active shooters 
behave in predictable ways that correspond with the anticipated event, but what happens 
if the active shooter has unanticipated accomplices or explosive devices set in the building? 
What if the active shooter is acting under the influence of a psychoactive drug that induces 
non-rational, erratic behavior? Generally speaking, there are innumerable influences that affect 
human behavior (e.g. emotions, environment, morality), so that an individual’s choices and 
conduct must also reflect a complex system’s characteristic unpredictability. Crisis professionals 
should expect human beings to take unanticipated actions and engage in nonlinear behavior 
that severely limits the effectiveness of a prediction-dependent SOP. 
Psychologist and Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman provides an interesting counterpoint 
to the alleged problem of ineffective SOPs applied to complex crises. He theorizes that the 
“everyday” experience of emergency responders refines their decision-making acumen to an 
instinctual level. This reflexive response would enable crisis professionals to react swiftly and 
effectively to unanticipated developments, regardless of ineffectual SOP guidance.11 Kahneman 
argues that a veteran crisis responder’s actions are primarily guided by experience, rendering 
checklist SOPs irrelevant.  That said, he also cautions that such decision-making will always be 
a risky proposition – even for veteran responders – and that for less experienced personnel, 
or those subjected to unique situations, instinctual reactions (or what he refers to as “fast 
thinking”) can have disastrous results.
Case Study: The Disaster Dilemma in Action
As previously stated, crises often demonstrate the prediction-defiant characteristics of 
complexity. In a complex emergency, the SOP may be of limited use if the actual event deviates 
from its anticipated behavior. This is the Disaster Dilemma. The September 11th terror attacks 
exhibited the characteristics of a complex event. As a case study, this mega-crisis affords the 
opportunity to assess the actual SOP-driven responses and compare them to a counterfactual 
adaptive approach, thereby exploring the article’s central hypothesis that success within a 
complex environment requires adaptability.
September 11th Terror Attacks
On the morning of September 11, 2001, 19 al Qaeda operatives boarded four commercial aircraft 
and seized control of the cockpits shortly after takeoff. After gaining control of the planes, the 
hijackers intentionally crashed them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center and into the 
Pentagon. The operatives appear to have crashed the fourth plane in a field near Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania, when it became evident the passengers might regain control of the aircraft. The 
coordinated terror attack of September 11th was the most significant crisis in American history in 
terms of lives lost, economic impact, and damage to the nation’s sense of security. 
 
Homeland Security Affairs | Volume 16 – Article 5  (August 2020) | WWW.HSAJ.ORG
6 The Case for Adaptive SOPs in Complex Crises and Unpredictable Operating Environments 
by Shawn Harwood and Wayne Porter, Ph.D. 
 
The initial identification and management of the crisis fell on the shoulders of the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). 
From the initial detection of a problem with American Airlines Flight 11, the 9/11 Commission 
states that crisis professionals were inhibited by their adherence to SOPs.12 FAA officers applied 
the agency hijacking SOP to the unfolding crisis even after the hijackers’ behavior deviated from 
expectations. The responding FAA officers adhered to the hijacking protocol by attempting to 
communicate with the pilots and coordinate support from NORAD. However, these efforts were 
ultimately irrelevant as the actual crisis was a terror attack, not a hijacking. The FAA’s attempt 
to respond to the wrong type of crisis wasted time that could have been spent assessing and 
responding to the true nature of the event.
What could these agencies have done differently? If the FAA recognized that the crisis had 
diverged from the predicted hijacking scenario, the agency could have departed from standard 
procedures earlier. FAA officials could have pushed for a faster, more significant response from 
NORAD, hypothetically giving the responding military pilots a chance to intercept the airliners. 
FAA National Operations Manager Ben Sliney eventually departed from agency SOPs when he 
grounded all commercial flights across the United States.13 However, the agency implemented 
this decision approximately one hour after the first plane struck the World Trade Center—
too late to save the other planes from capture. While the FAA’s determination to ground 
all commercial flights demonstrates an element of adaptability, it also illustrates how the 
unforgiving pace of modern disasters can render innovative decisions ineffective when delayed 
by adherence to non-adaptive or inappropriate SOPs.
As illustrated in this case study, while SOP-driven preparations and actions often hindered crisis 
response efforts, many emergency responders were able to navigate the complex environment 
by taking a flexible, adaptive approach.14 With regard to the September 11th crisis response, 
analysts James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf assert that “creativity is such a significant feature 
of response to an extreme event that planning and training should move explicitly toward 
enhancing creativity and the resultant improvisation at all levels of responding organizations.”15 
The FAA did achieve minor success by departing from SOP guidance to communicate directly 
with NORAD. As the 9/11 Commission reported, “[l]ower-level officials improvised—for 
example, the FAA’s Boston Center bypassed the chain of command and directly contacted 
NEADS [the Northeast Air Defense Sector of NORAD] after the first hijacking.”16 
The  U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) evacuation of the waters surrounding lower Manhattan was an 
even stronger example of adaptive disaster mitigation. USCG officers and inspectors successfully 
enlisted the aid of private and commercial watercraft to transport more than 500,000 citizens 
from the disaster area. USCG officers relied on their experience to recognize that certain 
regulations must be “adjusted with respect to ambient conditions and authority devolved 
to personnel closer to the scene for greater flexibility.”17 These efforts did not succeed by 
adherence to agency SOP; rather, success resulted from the recognition that standard methods 
must yield to adaptive actions to solve an unanticipated problem.
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While the New York Fire Department and other crisis professionals routinely worked in and 
around the World Trade Center disaster site, emergent groups of private citizens self-organized 
to meet ad hoc safety, health, and security needs in the surrounding area. These semi-
autonomous groups developed a loose connection with New York City’s Emergency Operations 
Center and rendered assistance in a decentralized fashion as they identified various needs in the 
crisis environment. Perhaps the most poignant example of successful, adaptive behavior was 
the self-organized response from the passengers aboard United Airlines Flight 93 that kept the 
terrorists on their flight from achieving their goal.18 As sociologist Kathleen Tierney states,  
“individuals and groups continued to show an amazing amount of ingenuity in circumventing 
and subverting procedures in order to provide goods and services they believed were needed.”19 
These emergent groups were uniquely suited to operate in the complex crisis environment on 
September 11th, as the needs of the moment inspired improvisational solutions in the absence 
of SOP guidance. 
The SOPs on which various crisis planning and response entities relied during the September 
11th events were often ineffectual because they applied prediction-dependent guidance in 
complex environments. When officials realized that the nature of the threat had significantly 
deviated from the initial assessment, there was little time to mitigate the actual crisis. The 
day’s operational successes consistently demonstrated examples of adaptive decision making. 
Whether it was the USCG’s departure from SOPs or an emergent group’s operation in the 
absence of a standardized process, innovative decision making is clearly a characteristic 
that organizations must foster within their emergency responses. The analysis based on the 
September 11 terror attack case study supports the central hypothesis that success within a 
complex environment requires adaptability.  
Adaptive SOP Design Proposals
If we accept that the case study argues in favor of integrating adaptability into modern crisis 
response, the next question must be: how can we integrate adaptability into crisis response 
SOPs? In their current form, SOPs are too rigid to provide effective direction when a crisis 
exhibits complex characteristics. A reliance on rote, checklist guidance in lieu of innovative or 
adaptive solutions has the potential to hamper emergency response when the disaster reality 
diverges from the disaster projection. Analysts Michael Bolton and Gregory Stolcis argue that 
standardized procedures are not effective “when ‘wicked’ problems alter the decision-making 
environment because there is little time to react to changing conditions. These problems are 
wicked because they are poorly formulated and fall outside normal boundaries of decision-
making.”20 The onset of spontaneous, unexpected problems within a crisis is the hallmark of 
the prediction-defiant complex environment. Based on the previous discussions of complexity 
and its unique impact on modern crisis environments (as illustrated in the September 11 case 
study), it appears that SOPs lack the adaptability required to impart effective guidance in a 
complex disaster. Therefore, proposals for an adaptive redesign of the crisis SOP model must 
rely upon more than concrete sets of instructions; they must serve as decision support systems 
that help crisis professionals navigate a dynamic and complex disaster environment.
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The integration of adaptability into emergency response is effectively the encouragement of 
critical thinking during a crisis. As such, the Socratic method of inquiry, sometimes referred to as 
the dialectic method, plays a fundamental role in the following recommendations.  Complexity 
scholars Richard Paul and Linda Elder describe the Socratic method as a cognitive process 
intended to stimulate critical thinking and comprehension through a dialogue of questions and 
answers, rather than simple rote learning. They call on readers to “[r]ecognize that all thoughts 
presuppose an information base. Assume that you do not fully understand the thought until 
you understand the background information that supports or informs it.”21 The Socratic method 
is a particularly relevant philosophy for emergency response in a complex crisis. Its emphasis 
on challenging assumptions and evaluating—and then re-evaluating—the problem prepares 
emergency responders to expect and identify the unexpected in an evolving scenario. 
Adaptive Design Proposal #1  
– Adaptability Prompts
Can SOP guidance devised to standardize action evolve to promote flexibility and critical 
thinking? The first design proposal attempts to answer that question with the integration of 
instructive prompts into an existing SOP checklist to guide responding officers in a complex 
scenario. This adaptive design proposal helps the emergency responder quickly identify 
unanticipated changes in the scenario and to evaluate how these changes should modify the 
crisis response. To illustrate the concept, Table 2 presents the Chicago Police Department’s SOP 
for active shooters (introduced as Table 1), modified to incorporate adaptability prompts, which 
are highlighted in yellow.
Figure 3. Active Shooter SOP with Adaptability Prompts22
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Based on the Socratic questioning principle, adaptability prompts stimulate critical thinking, 
thus constituting an evaluative (and re-evaluative) process for understanding a problem. This 
adaptive SOP design relies on those same principles to encourage crisis responders to evaluate 
regularly the crisis environment and adapt their behavior appropriately to the needs of the 
moment. By incorporating these concepts into the decision process, emergency responders 
can more effectively manage unpredictable emergencies.  Lagadec and Topper argue that 
crisis responders must learn to expect surprises in complex emergency scenarios and plan to 
revise response actions accordingly.23 Lagadec calls for institutional reform of the modern crisis 
response paradigm: “when the pace, the scope and the nature of the terrain thus depart so 
abruptly from accepted blueprints, our visions, our initiatives and our tools rapidly fall apart. 
We must rebuild them, and do so urgently.”24 Adaptability prompts are improvements to SOPs—
one of the fundamental tools used in crisis response—that could enhance awareness of the 
complexity in the field and to promote adaptable behavior.
Adaptive Design Proposal #2 – Crisis Co-pilot
Teachers of the Socratic method serve as a guide for their students’ cognitive processes, 
correcting the pursuit of flawed or erroneous assumptions. Rick Whitely asserts that, “[a]s the 
student begins to swerve off course or hits a brick wall, the role of the instructor is to direct the 
student in the right direction.”25 Crisis professionals would benefit from similar assistance to 
keep their cognitive process consistent with the Socratic emphasis on critical thinking during a 
complex emergency. Lagadec and Topper recommended employing cognitive assistance during 
an emergency. They developed the concept of a rapid reflection force whose purpose is “to help 
the leader to grasp and confront issues raised by unconventional situations.”26 They argued that 
the responsibility of leading emergency response actions, while simultaneously evaluating and 
re-evaluating the crisis environment, is a task that could exceed the capacity of a single person. 
Lagadec describes the emergency responder as a “crisis pilot” who navigates the unexpected 
to mitigate a complex disaster.27 In deference to his work, the second adaptive design proposal 
recommends instituting a crisis co-pilot. This concept synthesizes elements of the Socratic 
method as well as Lagadec and Topper’s rapid reflection force to create a professional role 
within the emergency response field that supports the primary emergency responder in an 
advisory capacity. The crisis co-pilot assists the lead emergency responder by reinforcing the 
aforementioned adaptability prompts. His primary function is to remind the lead emergency 
responder to (1) question expectations in the crisis scenario; (2) consider the impact of 
unpredicted deviations; and (3) conceive adaptive modifications to the operational plan in 
order to address the unexpected. This role could be performed by a member of an emergency 
response team in the field or remotely via a 911 “tactical” dispatch officer or similar.
The next section of this article will use a computer simulation experiment to answer the 
research question, “how effective is adaptive crisis response?”
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Multi-Agent System Simulation:  
The Effect of Increased Adaptability  
in a Complex Case Study
Whether deliberating a procurement request or a law-enforcement field operation, decision 
makers are expected to evaluate the prospective benefits and likelihood of success before 
committing personnel and resources.28 This process is challenging as it requires an estimation of 
a proposal’s potential. The evaluator must play the role of fortune teller to produce an analysis 
of future performance. Fortunately, modern computing advancements have improved the 
forecasting powers of government leaders. 
Multi-Agent System Simulations (MAS) are frameworks that approximate human decisions within a 
virtual system to identify the best means for achieving a desired outcome.  Pan et al. describe this 
scientific methodology as “an artificial environment populated with autonomous agents, which 
are capable of interacting with each other.”29 The overarching purpose of the MAS framework is to 
simulate individual human decision processes as well as to depict emergent patterns of individuals or 
factors interacting within the system.30 By following a set of behavioral rules, computer simulations 
can approximate human cognitive processes. The computer simulation assigns probabilities that 
agents in the scenario will make specific choices, incorporating elements of randomness, which 
produce statistically-relevant results and a convincing imitation of reality.
Heuristic 9/11 Simulation Experiments
To assess the central hypothesis of the effects of increased adaptability in complex environs, 
this article presents a heuristic MAS simulation based on historical data from the September 
11th terror attacks. This simulation provides the opportunity to measure the potential value 
of employing an adaptive crisis response against the prediction-dependent SOP approach. 
Case studies provide examples of an adaptive approach improving crisis response. The 
adaptive response designs presented above outline strategic recommendations for integrating 
adaptability into an SOP framework.  The simulation to follow will attempt to quantify the 
theoretical impact of integrating the adaptive SOP redesigns into modern disaster response – 
helping to clarify if the proposed changes would be worth the effort, time, and expense.  
The simulation focuses on the crisis response decisions made by the FAA and NORAD on the 
morning of September 11, 2001.31 The logic rules governing the behavior of the virtual agents are 
based on empirical observations taken from official accounts of the September 11th attacks and 
on a professional assessment of the FAA response paradigm to aviation anomalies in 2001, which 
is synthesized in Table 1.32 While these governing probabilities are based on observational data and 
assigned specific values through collaboration with a career FAA Air Traffic Security professional, 
the end result remains a subjective assessment of a complex environment and a set of theoretical 
interventions introduced into a crisis scenario.  As such, the simulation research as a practical 
assessment of the adaptive SOP proposals is limited by its purely hypothetical foundation.
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Table 1. FAA Threat Response to Aviation Anomalies (circa 2001)
Aviation Anomalous Event Impact on Threat Detection
Commercial aircraft fails to make a 
scheduled altitude change
25% more likely to identify a threat and 
initiate a crisis response
Commercial aircraft makes an 
unexpected altitude change
50% more likely to identify a threat and 
initiate a crisis response
Commercial aircraft’s transponder stops 
transmitting
50% more likely to identify a threat and 
initiate a crisis response
Commercial aircraft fails to respond to
FAA communication
50% more likely to identify a threat and 
initiate a crisis response
FAA intercepts suspicious transmissions 
from aircraft
50% more likely to identify a threat and 
initiate a crisis response
FAA receives messages from crew/
passengers suggestive of violence and/
or hijackers onboard
75% more likely to identify a threat and 
initiate a crisis response
  
The initial phase of the experiment – the control phase – simulated the FAA/NORAD decisions 
as they actually happened on the morning of September 11th. To prepare the simulation design, 
empirical data supplies the timing and flow of the events that took place on the day of the 
attack (see Figure 4).33
Figure 4. September 11th Attack - Flow of Events
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Relying on this information, logic rules govern the interactions between virtual agents and 
represent specific aviation anomalies that occurred during the event. For the control simulation, 
the FAA Boston Air Traffic Controller (ATC Boston) was represented by a virtual agent and the 
experiment began at time step 0, the analogue to 8:14 a.m. (EST) when Flight 11 made an 
unscheduled altitude change. This incident was the first observed aviation anomaly related 
to Flight 11 and the initial indicator of the September 11th attacks. The simulation progresses 
through incremental time steps, each representing one minute of actual time. The experiment 
allows the ATC Boston virtual agent one opportunity per time step to detect the Flight 11 virtual 
agent as a threat.
At the beginning of the simulation (time step 0), the logic rules allow the ATC Boston agent a 50 
percent chance of detecting Flight 11 as a threat. This detection probability is a programmed 
behavioral rule based on the FAA’s standardized response (circa 2001) when a commercial 
airplane demonstrates an aviation anomaly. With every subsequent irregularity, the probability 
that the virtual ATC Boston agent will detect Flight 11 as a threat increases – simulating 
an increasing suspicion of danger.  Using the aforementioned logic rules, the simulation 
successfully approximates the actual cycle of crisis identification and escalation during the 
September 11 terror attacks, represented in Figures 5, 6, and 7 from the simulation experiment.  
When the virtual agents become “convinced of the threat,” they convert from a red circle 
to a green X in the simulation environment and notify the next virtual agent in the chain of 
command, who replicates the same identification and escalation virtual process.  The simulation 
continues until the final agent becomes sufficiently convinced there is a threat and engages the 
Flight 11 simulated agent (the surrogate for NORAD’s decision to launch intercept fighters) at 
8:46 a.m. on September 11, 2001, analogous to time step 32.  
    
Figure 5. Initial Stage of  
9/11 Simulation
Figure 6. Interim Stage of  
9/11 Simulation
Figure 7. Final Stage of  
9/11 Simulation
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After executing the control simulation a statistically significant number of times (100 stochastic 
simulation runs) and analyzing the results, the summary statistics confirmed that the experiment 
consistently yielded a decision to launch alert fighters within one standard deviation of time step. 32 
The control experiment was therefore a reasonable and plausible simulation of the September 11th 
events.  With an accurate control simulation established, the second phase of the experiment could 
provide an effective environment to test the theoretical benefits of the adaptive SOP redesigns.
The phase two experiment seeks to quantify the value of integrating critical thinking and 
adaptability into crisis management by testing for an improvement in the September 11th 
time of response. It is important to note that systems modeling must often incorporate 
counterfactual assumptions or prospective policies and actions to evaluate potential outcomes. 
Specifically, the simulation in this second experiment assumes that the FAA and NORAD 
have implemented the adaptive SOP redesigns described in the previous section, prompting 
improvements in their responders’ ability to identify and mitigate the unexpected elements of 
the September 11th crisis. To obtain a demonstrable range of results, the ATC Boston agent’s 
initial chance to identify Flight 11 as a threat incrementally increases by five percent and the 
simulation runs 100 times at each five percent increment. The increase in initial detection 
probability for the ATC Boston virtual agent approximates the hypothetical improvement 
facilitated by incorporating innovation and adaptability into the crisis response.
The purpose of modifying the initial detection probability and running the experiment at each 
increment was to identify how much of an increase in the agent’s ability to detect an unexpected 
threat is required to improve the outcome of the scenario. It was reasoned that if the simulation 
results suggest the more adaptive approach must produce substantial improvements to change 
significantly the scenario outcome, then decision makers may determine that integrating 
adaptability and critical thinking may not be worth the time, expense, and effort. If the simulation 
results demonstrate that an adaptable approach simply needs to yield a modest improvement 
in crisis response to improve significantly the outcome, then decision makers should be more 
convinced of the value in implementing adaptive procedures to crisis response. 
Findings and Recommendations:
The goal of this experiment was to identify the point at which the order to launch alert fighters in 
time to intercept United Airlines Flight 175 should have been made: the point at which adaptive 
crisis response would have achieved a meaningful improvement in the scenario outcome. Flight 
175 was the second airliner to strike the World Trade Center, hitting the South Tower at 9:03 a.m. 
The alert fighters require 23 minutes from the launch order to travel 150 miles to New York City.34 
Considering these factors, the virtual NORAD needs to order the launch at 8:37 a.m. for the alert 
fighters to be in the vicinity of New York City by 9:00 a.m., allowing a three-minute window of 
opportunity for the military aircraft to intercept Flight 175 before it strikes the South Tower. In 
simulation terms, the goal of the experiment is to identify the percentage of improvement in the 
ATC Boston virtual agent’s threat-detection ability required to complete the intercept simulation 
by time step 23. After running the simulation 100 times for each incremental increase in the ATC 
Boston agent’s detection ability, the data distribution from each series can be analyzed, allowing a 
comparison of the experimental data against the stated goal of the simulation.
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Experiment Conclusions  
and the Central Hypothesis
Figure 8 displays the distribution of experimental data across all 20 increments of the ATC 
Boston agent’s percent improvement in initial threat detection (x-axis). The black horizontal line 
at time step 32, or 8:46 a.m., represents the time that NORAD actually gave the launch order 
on September 11th. The green horizontal line represents the goal of the experiment, to obtain 
a launch order by time step 23, or 8:37 a.m. The vertical dots represent the range of results for 
each incremental simulation series. The red brackets represent the results that fall within one 
standard deviation of the mean for each case, and the blue line connects the mean result for 
each series of percent improvement in detection ability.  
The graphical display of the experiment illustrates that the integration of adaptability and 
innovation could significantly decrease reaction time with only a modest improvement in the 
ATC Boston’s initial threat detection ability. 
Figure 8. Distributions from the Adaptive SOP Enhancement Simulation Experiment
The goal of completing the simulation by time step 23 falls within one standard deviation of 
the mean at the 25 percent increment. This outcome indicates that if the adaptive response 
yielded a 25 percent improvement in threat detection, then it is statistically feasible that the 
alert fighters could have intercepted Flight 175. The simulation results demonstrate that a crisis 
response that incorporates an adaptive, innovative methodology could yield a reasonable and 
significant benefit to the field of crisis response. 
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This simulation experiment is an exercise in counterfactual history intended to portray the 
prospective value of an adaptive crisis response. Of course, MAS simulation experiments cannot 
represent every nuance in human behavior or unpredicted influence in a complex system, so the 
experiment conclusions must appear as “if/then” statements rather than concrete assertions. 
Computer simulations are a product of theories, data, and educated guesses—they do not trade 
in absolutes.35 However, while these results are only hypothetical, they do effectively promote 
adaptability in crisis response by quantifying and visualizing their potential enhancements to 
the emergency response paradigm.  When combined with the arguments for adaptive response 
presented in the case study, the article’s central hypothesis that success in complex disasters 
requires adaptability is supported persuasively. 
The incorporation of adaptability prompts into the traditional SOP structure may help crisis 
professionals more effectively manage complex emergencies as they emerge. The SOP 
modifications make the expectation of change a core theme in every emergency response. Even 
more importantly, the prompts compel the emergency responder to adjust the operational plan 
to address the developments in the scenario. The inclusion of adaptability prompts may help 
integrate complexity awareness and adaptive action into the emergency response field, which 
would re-shape the traditional SOP model into a more effective tool for managing complex crises.
The use of SOPs may be an immutable component of government procedures, even in complex 
scenarios when their contribution is suspect. However, the implementation of adaptive design 
proposals would modify the traditional SOP to help responders more effectively manage 
complex events. In short, the adaptive designs are simple improvements to the emergency 
response tool box, engineered to achieve quick and uncomplicated implementation in the field. 
These changes might help crisis professionals effectively apply critical thinking and adaptability 
in an evolving crisis, allowing them to better protect themselves and their communities.  
Conclusion
When responding to an emergency, crisis professionals rely on their training, equipment, and 
experience, and act in accordance with SOPs. Ideally, the SOP checklist used ensures consistent 
and successful performance by correctly anticipating the events that will unfold within the 
operating environment and recommending appropriate actions. So long as the actual events 
adhere to the SOP’s predicted behavior, responders should make effective choices in the field. 
The Disaster Dilemma arises when an evolving crisis diverges from expectations and the SOP 
hampers effective response efforts by prescribing actions that are no longer appropriate in 
response to the emergent problem.
This research examined the problem of applying prediction-dependent SOPs in the complex 
twenty-first century crisis environment. Technological advancements in the digital age allow 
human beings to exert real-time influence on each other and their environment. Sociologists 
who describe this hyper-connected world as a complex system assert that one of its 
quintessential characteristics is unpredictability. Modern crises also demonstrate elements of 
complexity, making agent interactions and emergent behavior difficult to anticipate. 
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While the characteristics of modern crises have evolved, many of the SOPs used to manage 
them have not.  Fortunately, certain fields within the emergency response paradigm have 
begun evolving in ways that reflect the adaptive doctrines espoused in this article.  “Decision 
tree modeling” has begun to influence modern emergency response plans, promoting the 
expectation and mitigation of unexpected events.36  A specific instance of adaptive crisis 
response in practice is the nascent Incident Tactical Dispatcher (ITD) role adopted by some 
emergency response agencies in the United States. The ITD provides remote support to a field 
team leader operating in an emergency environment, maintaining constant radio contact and 
performing a number of critical duties to include helping to identify and mitigate unexpected 
problems.37 This emergency response function closely resembles the crisis co-pilot design 
recommendation and its capacity to promote adaptive response in emergency circumstances 
could revolutionize the concept of the 9-1-1 police dispatcher.
If traditional SOPs are too inflexible to impart effective direction in complex emergencies, 
modern disaster management needs a new approach. The 9-11 case study used in this research 
and simulation suggest that adaptive measures provide more effective solutions in complex 
environments. The simulation presented the hypothesis that the minimal integration of 
adaptive qualities into the response strategy can yield significant improvements in the outcome 
of a complex event. Finally, the proposed SOP design solutions address a practical methodology 
for integrating adaptive behavior and critical thinking into crisis response while allowing for the 
continued employment of SOP guidance in the emergency management arena. Modern crises 
demand a response that accounts for complexity in the environment. Implementing measures 
to integrate adaptability into emergency response may be a critical step in protecting our 
emergency responders and empowering them to better safeguard the public.
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